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ENHANCED COOPERATION: 
IS THERE HOPE FOR THE UNITARY PATENT?
Tihana BalagoviÊ*
Summary: This paper reviews the use of enhanced cooperation in the 
creation of a European Union patent system. It assesses whether the 
legal requirements for the application of enhanced cooperation are 
fulﬁ lled, and it does so in the light of the arguments raised by Italy 
and Spain in their actions for annulment brought before the European 
Court of Justice. The paper goes on to analyse whether the proposed 
patent system complies with the invoked legal basis, which requires 
the introduction of a new intellectual property right. If the answer is 
negative, possible ways to correct this mistake will be assessed. 
I. Introduction
A single patent, uniformly valid for the entire territory of the Eu-
ropean Union, has been desired for decades. Despite consensus on the 
need for such an instrument, Member States have still not reached una-
nimity regarding the exact speciﬁ cs of such a European Union patent 
system. 
Ultimately, twenty-ﬁ ve Member States resorted to the use of en-
hanced cooperation. This mechanism has existed ever since the Amster-
dam Treaty, but has been used only once before - to regulate the conﬂ ict 
of law rules regarding divorce.1 Numerous scholars and experts were 
convinced that enhanced cooperation would never be applied because 
they had considered the legal requirements for such cooperation impos-
sible to meet.2 Others were surprised at why such a powerful mechanism 
*  Trainee lawyer. I would like to thank Dr Tamara Δapeta for her advice as mentor in help-
ing me prepare this paper during my studies at the Faculty of Law in Zagreb.
1  Council Decision 2010/405/EU of 12 July 2010 authorizing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010] OJ L189/12. 
2  For example, Eric Philippart and Monika Sie Dhian Ho, ‘Flexibility and the New Constitu-
tional Treaty of the European Union’ (2003) Scientiﬁ c Council for Government Policy; Eric 
Phillipparta, ‘New Mechanism of Enhanced Cooperation for the Enlarged European Union’ 
(2003) 22 Research and European Issues; Massimo Bordignon and Sandro Brusco, ‘On 
Enhanced Cooperation’ (2006) 90(10-11) Journal of Public Economics 2063; Norberto Nuno 
Gomes de Andrade, ‘Enhanced Cooperation: The Ultimate Challenge of Managing Diversity 
in Europe: New Perspectives on the European Integration Process’ (2005) 40(4) Intereco-
nomics: Journal of European Economic Policy 201.
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was left aside and avoided.3 However, the opportunities to assess the ap-
plication of the legal conditions for the use of enhanced cooperation have 
so far been scarce.4 The case of divorce mostly went under the radar, 
possibly because it merely provides couples with an additional option in 
choosing the applicable law, thus not touching others’ interests and hav-
ing no inﬂ uential impact on the internal market.
This second case of enhanced cooperation may clarify some issues. 
Establishing a European Union patent in only some Member States is a 
highly controversial topic and raises numerous interesting questions im-
portant for the concept of enhanced cooperation. Can an instrument that 
is supposed to be a European Union instrument come into effect by means 
of enhanced cooperation? Does the circumstance that Italy and Spain, the 
only countries left behind, want to take part in the creation of a European 
Union patent prevent the rest of the Member States from proceeding with-
out them? What impact is enhanced cooperation allowed to have on the 
internal market, as it is bound to have at least some detrimental effect on 
trade with non-participating Member States? Further, patents are a vital 
economic tool and may present a competitive advantage for participating 
Member States; is it acceptable for enhanced cooperation to run contrary 
to the economic interests of some Member States? Regardless of the ﬁ -
nancial issues, can a European Union act discriminate on the ground of 
language, given that the European Union recognises the importance of 
safeguarding cultural and linguistic diversity? 
This article will reﬂ ect upon these latest questions and consider the 
arguments raised by Italy and Spain. Both countries ﬁ led actions with 
the European Court of Justice for the annulment of the decision author-
ising enhanced cooperation, claiming that enhanced cooperation does 
not comply with the necessary requirements.5
After an assessment of the formal conditions for enhanced coopera-
tion, this article will review the legality of acts that are to be reached 
3  For example, Daniel Thym, ‘“United in Diversity”: The Integration of Enhanced Coopera-
tion into the European Constitutional Order’ in Philipp Dann and Micha Rynkowski (eds), 
The Unity of the European Constitution, (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und 
Völkerrecht, vol 186,Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2006); Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, Sebas-
tian Kurpas, Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul and José I Torreblanca, ‘From Threat to Opportunity: 
Making Flexible Integration Work’ (2006) 15 European Policy Institutes Network, Working 
Paper. 
4  There are other examples of variable-geometry Europe and two-speed Europe, with the 
Schengen Area and Economic and Monetary Union as the most prominent examples. How-
ever, these cases did not apply the enhanced cooperation mechanism provided for by the 
Treaties, and thus may not be used for an interpretation of the legal requirements of en-
hanced cooperation.  
5  Case C-274/11 Spain v Council [2011] OJ C219/12; Case C-295/11 Italy v Council [2011] 
OJ C232/22.
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through enhanced cooperation. It will analyse whether the proposed pat-
ent system complies with the invoked legal basis, which requires the in-
troduction of a new intellectual property right. If the answer is negative, 
the article will assess possible ways to correct this mistake.
II. Background 
At the moment, patent protection in the European Union can be ob-
tained through national patents or European patents, but both systems 
have proven to be inadequate.
National patents suffer from the ﬂ aws inherent in a system governed 
by national laws. Rules governing the granting, existence and rights con-
ferred by such patents differ between countries and have the effect only on 
the territory of the country in question, creating a complex network of pat-
ent protection for the same invention through the territory of the European 
Union. Moreover, in the case of infringement, the patent proprietor has to 
enforce his rights before each national court, as there is no mutual recog-
nition of judgments in this area. The multiple procedures and language 
requirements of each country, particularly the requirement to publish the 
entire patent in the national language, result in high costs, while differ-
ences between national systems give rise to diverging decisions that create 
legal uncertainty and fragment patent protection in the internal market.
The European patent system shares the same problems. A Europe-
an patent can be obtained for one or more of 38 European countries that 
are parties to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents,6 and 
that is done in a single granting procedure before the European Patent 
Ofﬁ ce (hereinafter EPO).7 However, once a European patent is granted, 
it turns into a bundle of national patents. It has to be validated in each 
designated country with the payment of a validation fee to the national 
patent ofﬁ ce and often by providing a translation of the patent into the 
national language.8 Afterwards, the existence and enforcement of the 
European patent are again wholly governed by the national laws.9 
6  Convention on the Grant of European Patents of 5 October 1973 as revised by the Act re-
vising Article 63 of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the Convention of 29 November 
2000 (European Patent Convention) (hereinafter EPC). 
7  International organisation created by the EPC.
8  Art 65 para 1 EPC: ‘Any contracting state may, if the European patent as granted, amend-
ed or limited by the EPO is not drawn up in one of its ofﬁ cial languages, prescribe that the 
patent proprietor shall supply to its central industrial property ofﬁ ce a translation of the 
patent as granted, amended or limited in one of its ofﬁ cial languages at his option or, where 
that state has prescribed the use of one speciﬁ c ofﬁ cial language, in that language’.
9  Art 2 para 2 EPC: ‘A European patent shall, in each of the contracting states for which 
it is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent 
granted by that state, unless otherwise provided in the EPC’.
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It has been widely recognised that the current situation hinders inno-
vation and hampers the integration of the internal market. A single Euro-
pean Union patent granted in one procedure without further requirements 
and having the same effect over the entire territory would put an end to 
these troubles. Unfortunately, this is more easily said than done.
Negotiations started in the 1960s, but the European Union patent 
has still not seen the light of day. The main issue is the question of abol-
ishing the translation requirements and designating only some languag-
es for patent applications and publications. Although this is necessary to 
lower the costs of patent protection, most of the Member States hesitate 
to give up their national language as an ofﬁ cial patent language.
In 2009, it became clear that this impasse could not continue, es-
pecially with the economic situation calling for the stimulation of inno-
vation and development. There then came a major breakthrough. It was 
agreed that the EPO would be endowed with the authority to grant Euro-
pean Union patents with effect throughout the Union territory, and that 
specialised patent courts with exclusive jurisdiction for patents would be 
established.10 However, the language regime was subjected to further dis-
cussion.11 The problems regarding translation reoccurred, and by the end 
of 2010 an agreement had still not been reached. The proposed system 
suggested the use of ofﬁ cial EPO languages, namely English, German and 
French, but had ‘fallen short of unanimity by a small margin’.12
In response, twelve Member States proposed the use of enhanced 
cooperation for the creation of a unitary patent, and were soon joined by 
another thirteen Member States, leaving out only Italy and Spain. With 
the approval of the European Parliament, the Council adopted a Decision 
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection.13
Enhanced cooperation is a mechanism provided for in the Treaties, 
which enables a group of a minimum of nine Member States to proceed 
10  The issue of courts was another stumbling block when the European Court of Justice 
clariﬁ ed that the proposed system would breach EU law. However, this lies outside the am-
bit of this paper. See Opinion of the Court 1/09 [2011] ECR 00000.
11  Europa, ‘Patents: EU achieves political breakthrough on an enhanced patent system’, 
Press Release IP/09/1880 of 4 December 2009 <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAc-
tion.do?reference=IP/09/1880&type=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr> ac-
cessed 29 March 2012.
12  Council of the European Union Press Release 16041/10 of 10 November 2010 <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/117687.pdf> ac-
cessed 29 March 2012.
13  Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorizing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection [2011] OJ L76/53 (hereinafter Author-
ising Decision).
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with integration in a certain area if concerted action proves impossible. 
The decisions reached through enhanced cooperation are applicable only 
in the participating Member States. When enhanced cooperation is used, 
a minimum of two decisions are needed. The ﬁ rst one is a decision au-
thorising enhanced cooperation, proposed by the Commission, approved 
by the European Parliament, and reached by the Council acting unani-
mously but with only the participating Member States having the right 
to vote.
The second one is a decision implementing the authorised enhanced 
cooperation by adopting substantive provisions and using the relevant 
Treaty procedures, also with only the participating Member States tak-
ing part in the vote.14
In the case of unitary patent protection, the Authorising Decision 
allowed the use of enhanced cooperation, and forms the ground for two 
implementing decisions: the decision creating unitary patent protection 
and the decision on translation agreements for such protection.15 At the 
moment, these are in the phase of proposals, namely the Proposal for a 
Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the crea-
tion of unitary patent protection, and the Proposal for a Regulation im-
plementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection with regard to applicable translation arrangements.16 
However, the Authorising Decision refers to the current versions of the 
proposals, thus making them eligible for assessment.
In its current version, the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal still 
envisages that the EPO will grant patents in accordance with the EPC, 
but provides the option of designating the entire territory of the twenty-
ﬁ ve participating Member States.17 If this is done, the European patent 
will have a unitary effect in the area, thus being limited, transferred, 
revoked or allowed to lapse in respect of all these states.18 Moreover, once 
14  Arts 329 and 330 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union as amended 
by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) (hereinafter TFEU).
15  Separate decisions are necessary because the Treaty prescribes a different legislative 
procedure for establishing measures that create unitary intellectual property rights from 
the translation agreements regarding these rights. See art 118 TFEU.
16  Proposal COM/2011/215 of 13 April 2011 for a Regulation of the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of uni-
tary patent protection (hereinafter Unitary Patent Protection Proposal or UPPP); Proposal 
COM/2011/216 of 13 April 2011 for a Regulation of the Council and the European Par-
liament implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements (hereinafter Translation 
Proposal or TP).
17  Art 2 c) UPPP (n 16).
18  Art 3 UPPP (n 16).
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this European patent with unitary effect is granted and registered at the 
EPO, no further national requirements apply.19  
This is in line with the Translation Proposal, which abolishes the 
option of requiring further national translations after the application 
and publication are made in English, French or German. This system 
will apply after a transitional period lasting a maximum of twelve years. 
During the transitional period, patents with French or German as the 
language of the proceedings will have to be submitted with a full trans-
lation in English, and ones with English will have to be submitted with 
a full translation into any language of the participating Member States 
that is an ofﬁ cial language of the Union. The point of the transitional 
period is to wait for the availability of high quality translation machines, 
which will then translate patent applications into all the ofﬁ cial lan-
guages of the Union. Until then, all applicants ﬁ ling a patent application 
at the EPO in one of the Union languages and not in an ofﬁ cial EPO lan-
guage will have their translation costs reimbursed up to a ceiling.20 
III. Authorisation Decision - the legality of enhanced cooperation
III.1. Non-exclusive competence of the EU
The areas eligible for enhanced cooperation are deﬁ ned in the ﬁ rst 
paragraph of Article 20 TEU,21 which stipulates: 
Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation be-
tween themselves within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive 
competences may make use of its institutions and exercise those 
competences by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties ...
Therefore, to use enhanced cooperation in the area of unitary patent 
protection, the creation of such protection must be a non-exclusive com-
petence of the Union. Article 118 TFEU provides for powers to establish 
European intellectual property,22 and the Authorising Decision invokes 
19  Art 10 para 4 UPPP (n 16).
20  Art 6 TP (n 16).
21  Treaty on the European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) [2010] OJ 
C83/13 (hereinafter TEU) (emphasis added).
22  Art 118 TFEU (n 14): ‘In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the creation of European intellectual 
property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property rights throughout the 
Union and for the setting up of centralized Union-wide authorization, coordination and 
supervision arrangements. The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative pro-
cedure, shall by means of regulations establish language arrangements for the European 
intellectual property rights. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament’.
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it as a legal basis for the unitary patent. Both Spain and Italy submit-
ted pleas claiming that the European Union has exclusive competence 
to create European intellectual property rights, thus leaving article 118 
TFEU out of the scope of enhanced cooperation.23 
Article 118 TFEU identiﬁ es its own framework, by deﬁ ning that the 
measures it provides for are to be introduced in the context of the es-
tablishment and functioning of the internal market. Accordingly, the in-
troduction of new intellectual property rights should be perceived as an 
internal market matter, and the internal market is a shared competence 
of the Union.24 
Moreover, the creation of unitary patent protection is not mentioned 
under the Union’s exclusive competences. These are listed in article 3 
TFEU, and include the areas of customs union, establishing the competi-
tion rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, monetary 
policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro, conservation of 
marine biological resources under the common ﬁ sheries policy, and the 
common commercial policy.
Of this exhaustive list,25 patents are related only to competition and 
common commercial policy. Regarding common commercial policy, in-
tellectual property rights are closely linked to the trade in products and 
services to which they apply.26 However, article 207 TFEU restricts the 
scope of common commercial policy to the commercial aspects of intel-
lectual property rights.27 This novelty, introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, 
prevents the Council from expanding the area of common commercial 
policy to non-commercial features of intellectual property.28 The creation 
of unitary patent protection does not, by any means, regulate the trade-
related aspects of patents.29 
23  Spain (n 5) point 3.2; Italy (n 5) ﬁ rst argument.
24  Art 4 para 2 point a) TFEU (n 14). 
25  Amedeo Arena, ‘The Doctrine of Union Preemption in the EU Single Market: Between 
Sein and Sollen’ (2010) Jean Monnet Working Paper 03/10, 11 <http://centers.law.nyu.
edu/jeanmonnet/papers/10/100301.pdf> accessed 9 March 2012.
26  Opinion of the Court 1/94 [1994] ECR I-05267 para 54.
27  Art 207 TFEU (n 14): ‘The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform prin-
ciples, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intel-
lectual property...’.
28  Markus Krajewski, ‘The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy’ in A Biondi and P 
Eeckhout (eds), European Union Law after the Treaty of Lisbon (OUP 2012) 14 available at
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201012/20101207ATT 
07788/20101207ATT07788EN.pdf> accessed 9 March 2012.
29  Steve Peers, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the EU Patent’ (2011) 7 European Con-
stitutional Law Review 229, 251.
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As for the issue of competition, patents are a state-approved monop-
oly, and there is a body of case law created by the European Court of 
Justice concerning the relation between competition rules and intellectu-
al property rights.30 Nevertheless, the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal 
does not deal with this aspect of patents either.31 It has a special provision 
stipulating that unitary patent protection is to be without prejudice to the 
application of competition law and law relating to unfair competition. It 
also omits to regulate compulsory licensing, the most prominent institute 
dealing with the impact intellectual property has on competition.32
Even if the proposal included compulsory licenses,33 it would still 
not fall under the area of the regulation of competition. In the architec-
ture of the TFEU, article 118 falls under the title dealing with approxi-
mation of laws, together with article 114 which is used as a legal basis for 
harmonisation.34 Both article 114 TFEU and article 118 TFEU delineate 
improvement in the functioning of the internal market as their objective, 
and their application should be assessed in the light of whether a legal 
act shares that intent, regardless of the potential ancillary impact it has 
on neighbouring areas.35 The main idea behind unitary patent protection 
is to facilitate patents that are uniformly valid over the entire territory 
of the internal market. In this way, a supposedly single market would 
not be partitioned into 27 different territories, as is now the case with 
only national patents and with patent protection beginning and end-
ing at each national border.36 Unitary patent protection therefore aims 
to achieve better integration of the internal market and falls under the 
shared competences of the EU.37
The exhaustive list of exclusive competences was introduced, at the 
same time as Article 118 TFEU, by the Lisbon Treaty. If the creation of 
new forms of intellectual property was meant to be an exclusive compe-
tence, it would have been explicitly mentioned under Article 3 TFEU, or 
would have implicitly fallen under the areas enumerated therein.
Still, Italy argues that only the EU can introduce European rules 
required to create ‘European intellectual property rights’ to which article 
30  For instance, see Case T-201/04 Microsoft [2007] ECR II-03601 and Case T-321/05 
AstraZeneca [2010] ECR 0000.
31  Peers (n 29) 251.
32  Art 19 UPPP (n 16).
33  As suggested in IV below.
34  Part 3 Title VII TFEU (n 14). 
35  See Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising [2000] ECR I-08419.
36  Victor Rodriguez, ‘Constructing a Unitary Title Regime for the European Patent System’ 
(2011) 6(8) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 574, 579.
37  On whether it actually achieves this, or raises a contrary effect, see III. 4. 
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118 TFEU refers, thus elevating it to a de facto exclusive competence of 
the Union. First of all, enhanced cooperation is limited to non-exclusive 
competences because all Member States agreed to completely transfer 
their sovereignty in areas of exclusive competences to the European Un-
ion. Consequently, they are not permitted to regulate these issues on 
their own, not even by using enhanced cooperation.38 The existence of 
de facto exclusive competence does not entail a loss of sovereignty, so it 
should not prevent the use of enhanced cooperation.
Secondly, article 118 TFEU provides authorisation to ‘establish 
measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to pro-
vide uniform protection throughout the Union’. This came into existence 
as an explicit recognition of the Union’s competence to introduce new 
forms of supra-national intellectual property, which previously had to be 
adopted under the residual legal basis of article 352 TFEU.39 Therefore, 
reference to the creation of European intellectual property rights can be 
understood as an emphasis of their transnational autonomous charac-
ter, and an indication of the Union’s territory as a necessity to achieve 
uniform protection. There are no obstacles preventing Member States 
from creating sui generis supranational intellectual property rights hav-
ing unitary effect throughout their territories, and consequently over 
the territory of the European Union. There is also no reason why these 
rights would not be European intellectual property rights, such as the 
European patent that already exists outside the scope of the EU. Article 
118 TFEU indisputably presents an appropriate ground for the creation 
of European intellectual property, but it does not itself vest the Europe-
an Union with exclusive competence for the creation of new intellectual 
property having effect over the Union’s territory.40 Embarking on the cre-
ation of such rights could prove to be more appropriate at the EU level, 
but this does not imply exclusive competence; it amounts to compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity governs 
the EU’s actions in the ﬁ eld of shared competences by allowing the EU 
to act only when such actions are better achieved at the Union level.41 If 
all issues beneﬁ ting from the involvement of the European Union were 
considered an exclusive competence, the use of enhanced cooperation 
would be prohibited in the entire area of shared competences, contrary 
to the expression ‘non-exclusive’ used in article 20 TEU.
38  Carlo Maria Cantore, ‘We’re One, But We’re Not the Same: Enhanced Cooperation and 
the Tension between Unity and Asymmetry in the EU’ (2011) 3(3) Perspectives on Federal-
ism 7 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006513> accessed 3 March 2012.
39  See IV.1 below.
40  See by analogy of the implied competences, Opinion of the Court 1/94 [1994] ECR I-
05267, para 100.
41  Art 5 para 3 TEU (n 21).
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Even if article 118 TFEU referred to ‘European Union intellectual 
property rights’, which it does not, this would be only natural. Instru-
ments established by the European Union are to be European Union 
instruments, and no one but the European Union can do this. This does 
not mean that every action involving the European Union, every legal 
basis referring to a European Union institute or every mention of the 
Union’s territory should be considered outside the scope of enhanced 
cooperation. Article 20 TEU unambiguously authorises Member States 
taking part in enhanced cooperation to exercise the Union’s competenc-
es and use the Union’s institutions. Although they are regularly used by 
the Union as a whole and are thus referred to as the Union’s, this does 
not prevent a group of Member States from utilising them. Enhanced co-
operation is in its spirit an exception to the rule. Moreover, it was never 
used before the Lisbon Treaty, although it has been provided for since 
the Amsterdam Treaty. It would be inappropriate to expect that provi-
sions of the Treaty count on the use of enhanced cooperation and thus 
omit indicating the European Union in their wording. It would be equally 
tenuous to rely on the mention of the European Union as a whole in order 
to preclude the use of enhanced cooperation, if all other requirements 
are met.42
Ultimately, competence for the creation of European intellectual 
property titles can be categorised as an internal market competence and 
hence as a shared competence, without entailing the loss of sovereignty 
regarding national legislation.43 Therefore, enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the creation of unitary patent protection complies with the re-
quirement of being established within the framework of the Union’s non-
exclusive competences.
III.2. Last resort 
Enhanced cooperation can be a powerful tool for overcoming a po-
litical impasse.44 However, it should not be used to circumvent legislative 
procedures in cases of simple disagreements over policy choices, as that 
42  For whether the aim and effect of art 118 TFEU can be preserved through enhanced 
cooperation, see III.4 below.
43  Maximilian Brosinger and others, ‘IP Law Reform and the Treaty of Lisbon’ (1 September 
2008)
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper, 
No 09-03 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340861> accessed 3 
March 2012.
44  Cantore (n 38) 10, quoting Craig Paul, ‘The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Re-
form’ (OUP 2010). 
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would jeopardise the institutional balance within the EU.45 The second 
paragraph of article 20 TEU safeguards against that:
The decision authorizing enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by 
the Council as a last resort, when it has established that the objec-
tives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable 
period by the Union as a whole.
A group of Member States can have recourse to the use of enhanced 
cooperation only if the concerted action of all Member States proves im-
possible. Italy claims that the Authorising Decision was adopted without 
an appropriate inquiry regarding the last resort condition and without 
an adequate statement of reasons.46 Spain issued a similar plea, and 
complemented it by claiming that enhanced cooperation amounts to a 
misuse of power, since the objective of creating unitary patent protection 
could have been achieved by means of a special agreement provided for 
in article 142 EPC.47  Italy and Spain generally seek to take part in the 
creation of unitary patent, but they oppose the proposed languages sys-
tem. They agree with the policy, but are left behind on account of the 
linguistic matters.48 Therefore, the real question seems to be whether it 
is necessary for cooperation of the Union as a whole to be impossible be-
cause some Member States are unwilling to integrate in the area or are 
or even incapable of doing so, or whether it is it enough for cooperation to 
be impossible on account of differing opinions and lack of agreement.49 
When the Amsterdam Treaty introduced enhanced cooperation, then 
called ‘closer cooperation’, the last resort principle was worded to em-
phasise inability to attain the Union’s objectives, stating that enhanced 
cooperation ‘is only used as a last resort, where the objectives of the said 
Treaties could not be attained by applying the relevant procedures laid 
down therein’.50 This was in line with enhanced cooperation coming into 
existence as an institutional response to the progressive enlargement of 
the EU, as the EU began to encompass countries vastly diverging in their 
economic and institutional background.51 The core idea of enhanced co-
operation was to strike a balance between countries that are able and 
45  Thomas Jaeger, ‘All Back to Square One? An Assessment of the Latest Proposals for a 
Patent and Court for the Internal Market and Possible Alternatives’ (2012) Max Planck Insti-
tute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, No 12-01, 6.
46  Spain (n 5) third argument.
47  Italy (n 5) points 1 and 3.1.
48  Cantore (n 38) 13.
49  Jaeger (n 45) 6.
50  Art 43 para 1 c) TEU (n 21) (emphasis added).
51  Cantore (n 38) 5.
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willing to foster further integration, and countries that are not.52 If such 
discrepancies were to endanger the very objective of the Union, enhanced 
cooperation could provide a solution.
The Nice Treaty kept the last resort principle, but changed its word-
ing to stipulate that:
[E]nhanced cooperation may only be set up when it has been estab-
lished within the Council that the objectives of such cooperation can-
not be attained within a reasonable period by applying the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties.53
This amendment focuses on the enhanced cooperation objectives 
rather than the EU and Treaties objectives, thus emphasising that 
such a mechanism would be used as a solution in the case of a political 
deadlock. Enhanced cooperation is in its current version perceived as a 
method to avoid any severe decision-making paralysis, rather than as 
an instrument for advancement in policy areas where only some Mem-
ber States ﬁ nd it acceptable to integrate.54 The provision remained the 
same in the Lisbon Treaty, and it does not by any means imply that the 
reasons why the objectives of an action cannot be attained play a role 
when deciding whether the condition of last resort is satisﬁ ed. Therefore, 
it should be considered fulﬁ lled if an agreement cannot be attained in 
the foreseeable future, and not only when Member States reject the very 
idea of the proposed policy.55
The ﬁ rst authorisation of enhanced cooperation conﬁ rms this ap-
proach. Its implementing act is the Rome III Regulation, which approxi-
mates conﬂ ict of law rules in the matter of divorce.56 TFEU prescribes a 
special legislative procedure, with the Council acting unanimously for 
the adoption of rules on family law with cross-border implications.57 It 
was impossible to reach unanimity as some Member States opposed the 
Regulation in so far as it occasionally provided for the application of 
foreign divorce law. It was mostly the Scandinavian states which share 
a liberal approach to divorce that did not consider it appropriate to ap-
52  ibid, quoting Bribosia (2007).
53  Art 43 para 1 a) TEU (n 21) (emphasis added).
54  Dragos Negrescu and Gilda Truica, ‘Can EU’s Enhanced Cooperation Mechanism Provide 
Solutions to the “Single Undertaking” Problems of the WTO?’ (2006) 6(2) Romanian Journal 
of European Affairs 5, 15 <http://www.ier.ro/documente/rjea_vol6_no2/RJEA_Vol6_No2_
Can_the_EUs_Enhanced_Co-operation_Mechanism_Provide_Solutions_to_the_“Single_Un-
dertaking”_Problems_of_the_WTO.pdf> accessed 9 March 2012.
55  Peers (n 29), 259.
56  Council Regulation 1259/2010/EU of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced coope-
ration in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010] OJ L343/10.
57  Art 81 para 2 TFEU (n 14).
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ply more restrictive laws.58 It should be noted that they did not oppose 
approximation in the ﬁ eld of family law itself, but they considered that 
it should provide more ﬂ exibility to satisfy the concerns of all Member 
States. Therefore, there was a consensus regarding the policy, but a disa-
greement regarding its substance. The Rome III Regulation has not so far 
been contested and there are sufﬁ cient reasons to believe that enhanced 
cooperation met the legal requirements.59
The fact that Italy and Spain want to take part in the Unitary Patent 
Proposal and the Translation Proposal, but not under the given condi-
tions, should thus not be taken into account when assessing the condi-
tion of last resort.60
Spain claims that enhanced cooperation would amount to misuse 
given that other options are available outside the European Union. How-
ever, this claim seems misplaced. In all situations eligible for enhanced 
cooperation, namely in the areas of non-exclusive competences, there 
is an option of intergovernmental agreement between willing Member 
States. The point of the claim is not that either Italy or Spain would join 
such a special agreement under the current conditions and thus facili-
tate a higher level of unity, but just that enhanced cooperation is not the 
only choice for achieving unitary patent protection between twenty-ﬁ ve 
Member States.61 The second paragraph of article 20 TEU permits the 
use of enhanced cooperation as a last resort option, and unequivocally 
deﬁ nes last resort as a situation where ‘the objectives of such coopera-
tion cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a 
whole’, not as a situation where no other options outside the Union exist. 
The assessment of the availability of enhanced cooperation should thus 
be restricted to asserting whether it is feasible to expect an agreement to 
be reached at the EU level in the foreseeable future.
As for the unlikelihood of attaining unitary patent protection within 
a reasonable time, it should sufﬁ ce to say that the history of cumbersome 
efforts to create a European patent with transnational unitary effect 
58  Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision No …/2010/EU authorising enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, COM(2010) 
104 ﬁ nal, point 4.
59  Steve Peers, ‘Divorce, European Style: The First Authorization of Enhanced Cooperation’ 
(2010) 6 European Constitutional Law Review 339. 
60  See by analogy the Court of Justice’s ruling that a non-participant in the Schengen ac-
quis cannot demand that the other Member States amend draft legislation building on that 
acquis so that it can participate. Case C-482/08 UK v Council [2010] ECR 00000.
61  Italy and Spain opposed the trilingual language system from the beginning, and there 
are no reasons to believe that their attitude would change with agreement being concluded 
outside the EU.
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goes even further back into the past than the European Union itself;62 it 
started in 1957, and is so far without success.63  The intergovernmen-
tal approach, taken up to the 1990s, resulted in the Community Patent 
Convention from 197664 and its amendment from 1989,65 both signed but 
never ratiﬁ ed. They were meant to introduce a single Community Pat-
ent uniformly valid over the entire territory, but they failed because of a 
disagreement over the issue of translations. The requirement remained 
of ﬁ ling national translations and thus did not meet the standard of cost 
effectiveness. Based on the position taken in the Commission Green Pa-
per in 1997,66 the approach changed from that of an intergovernmental 
agreement to a European Union Regulation, resulting in the Community 
Patent Regulation Proposal. The ﬁ rst draft in 200067 contained a lan-
guage system similar to the current Translation Proposal. It was widely 
supported by industry, but was not politically acceptable. The second 
draft in 200468 changed the language regime to require translations in 
all national languages. This resulted in the loss of support from industry 
because of the lack of added value, and the proposal was ﬁ nally rejected 
in 2004 after no consensus was reached in the Council. The issue was 
re-launched in 2007,69 with the Translation Proposal in 201070 abolish-
ing the requirement of national translations, in line with the Community 
Patent Regulation Proposal of 2000. Despite several Council meetings, it 
has proved impossible to reach a unanimous agreement and this has led 
to the currently approved enhanced cooperation.  
Not only has the issue of unitary patents been thoroughly discussed 
over the last 60 years, but the proposed translation system solution has 
also existed ever since the Community Patent Proposal of 2000. Just 
for comparison, the debate over approximating the conﬂ ict of law rules 
62  Van Empel, ‘The Granting of European Patents: Introduction to the Convention on the 
Grant of European Patents’ (AW Sijthoff 1973) ch 1.
63  Thomas Jaeger, ‘The EU Patent: Cui bono et quo vadit?’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 63.
64  Convention 76/76/EEC of the 5 October 1973 for the European Patent for the common 
market, [1976] OJ L17/1.
65  Agreement 89/695/EEC of 15 December 1989 relating to Community patents [1989] 
OJ L401/1.
66  Green Paper COM/97/314 of 24 June 1997 on the Community patent and the patent 
system in Europe.
67  Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community patent COM (2000) 
412 ﬁ nal. 
68  Preparation 7119/04 of 8 March 2004 for the meeting of the Council on 11 March 
2004.
69  Commission, ‘Enhancing the patent system in Europe’ (Communication) COM (2007) 
165 ﬁ nal.
70  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the translation arrangements for the 
European Union patent’ COM (2010) 350 ﬁ nal. 
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regarding divorce lasted from the Green Paper in 2005 to the request for 
enhanced cooperation in 2008, and in that case three years were consid-
ered sufﬁ cient to ﬁ nd that there were insurmountable difﬁ culties!
Last resort is, of course, not just a matter of the years spent ne-
gotiating, but when it comes to the unitary patent and solutions for its 
translations, the fact that all viable options have already been discussed 
over a lengthy period of time. If consensus could have been reached, 
there were enough situations at hand to ﬁ nd it. Nothing in the past or 
present situation gives ground to believe that agreement could be made 
in the foreseeable future by the Union as a whole. Consequently, there 
should be no doubt about the unitary patent fully satisfying the condi-
tion of last resort.
III.3. Discrimination
Enhanced cooperation derogates from the Treaties only so far as 
they prescribe the legislative procedures necessary to adopt certain de-
cisions, and that is mitigated by making the enhanced cooperation acts 
binding just for the participating Member States.71 The rest of the Trea-
ties and EU rules still regularly apply, as stated in the ﬁ rst paragraph 
of article 326 TFEU: ‘Any enhanced cooperation shall comply with the 
Treaties and Union law’. Therefore, it should be assessed whether the 
Authorising Decision and implementing proposals violate EU law and its 
principles.
The most controversial element of unitary patent protection is the 
question of language. The Translation Proposal suggests a general rule 
under which patent applications can be made only in English, French or 
German, with no additional translation requirements allowed.
Italy and Spain claim that this trilingual system violates the princi-
ple of non-discrimination.72 Freedom from discrimination is a core value 
of the European Union,73 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights ex-
plicitly prohibits any discrimination based on the ground of language.74 
Moreover, a separate article of the Charter emphasises respect for lan-
71  Art 20 para 4 TEU (n 21).
72  Spain (n 5) point 3.2; Italy (n 5) last argument.
73  Ian Bryan, ‘Equality and Freedom from Discrimination: Article 13 EU Treaty’ (2002) 
24(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 223 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1423842> accessed 2 March 2012.
74 Art 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2010] C83/389 (hereinafter Charter): 
‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, 
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’. 
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guage diversity.75 Therefore, it should be reviewed whether a restriction 
to only three languages amounts to discrimination and disrespect re-
garding the remaining twenty Union languages.
The Court has already ruled that a similar language regime of the 
Community Trademark Regulation does not fall under the scope of the 
principle of non-discrimination.76 The regulation designates English, 
Italian, French, German and Spanish as ofﬁ cial languages, and was 
contested for allegedly discriminating against all other languages. The 
Court has in both instances held that the Treaties’ references to the use 
of languages do not form a general principle of law which would confer 
a right on every citizen to ‘have a version of anything that might affect 
his interests drawn up in his language in all circumstances’.77 At the 
time of the judgment, the Treaties included the general principle of non-
discrimination, as well as rules providing citizens of the Union with a 
right to correspond with the Union’s institutions in any Union language. 
However, the Charter did not exist at that point, and its explicit mention 
of language may have broadened the applicable scope of discrimina-
tion. 
If the proposed language system does present an a priori case of lan-
guage discrimination, attention should be paid to the Charter’s provision 
on the scope and interpretation of rights and principles. Article 52 of 
the Charter permits the limitation of rights recognised by the Charter if 
certain conditions are met. Such limitation must be provided for by law, 
must respect the essence of rights in question, and must be subjected to 
the principle of proportionality. In the case of a limitation of certain fun-
damental rights, the applicable principle of proportionality requires that 
the limitations are necessary, that they genuinely meet the objectives of 
general interest recognised by the Union, and that they comply with pro-
portionality stricto sensu - meaning that the limitation is proportionate 
to the pursued aim.78
The Translation Proposal is based on the second paragraph of ar-
ticle 118 TFEU, which authorises the establishment of language ar-
75  Art 22 Charter (n 74): ‘The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diver-
sity’.  
76  Case C-361/01 P Kik [2003] ECR I-8283, upholding the Court of First Instance judgment 
in Case T-120/99 Kik [2001] ECR II-2235.
77  ibid, para 82.
78  Art 52 Charter (n 74): ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recog-
nized by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if 
they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’ (emphasis added).
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rangements regarding European intellectual property rights.79 The term 
‘language arrangement’ entails the possibility of restraining from the use 
of all national languages, otherwise a special arrangement would not be 
needed. Moreover, article 118 was drafted with the EU patent in mind.80 
As it was already clear that translation costs must be reduced, the sec-
ond paragraph was added to subject language limitations to unanimity in 
the Council, thus making them binding only for the consenting Member 
States. At the time this provision was adopted, the current trilingual mod-
el had already been tabled.81 Therefore, the limitation of languages used 
for patents is founded on law. It falls under article 118 TFEU, which was 
both drafted and adopted in the light of such language arrangements.
With regard to respecting the essence of language diversity, it would 
be very difﬁ cult to argue that the technical language of patents reﬂ ects 
the essence of multilingualism. Patents do not embody a culture, and the 
limitation of languages in patent applications does not result in a loss of 
tradition or national identity.82 As Steve Peers poetically puts it, ‘it can 
hardly be claimed that the richness of languages of Cervantes and Dante 
is dependent upon their use in patent claims’.83
As for necessity, the high cost of patent protection in the European 
Union is considered to be one of the main drawbacks of the existing 
system, and patent users univocally emphasise the need for cost reduc-
tion.84 At the moment, obtaining patent protection in thirteen Member 
States costs EUR 12,500, and rises to over EUR 32,000 if obtained for 
79  Art 118 TFEU (n 14): ‘The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative pro-
cedure, shall by means of regulations establish language arrangements for the European 
intellectual property rights. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the Euro-
pean Parliament’. .
80  See, for example, Report Session of House of Lords’ European Union Committee <http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf> accessed 7 
March 2012.
81  That is, by adopting the Lisbon Treaty.
82  Jason R Riley, ‘The Community Patent, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the English Language’ (2002) 18 (2) Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Jour-
nal 299, 304 <http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol18/iss2/6> accessed 5 March 
2012.
83  Peers (n 29) 256.
84  For small and medium enterprises, see Commission, ‘Think Small First - A Small Busi-
ness Act for Europe, Communication’ (Communication) COM (2008) 0394 ﬁ nal; European 
Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME) ‘Expectations on the 
Proposal for a European Small Business Act’ <www.ueapme.com> accessed 5 March 2012; 
Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry, ‘Response to the Consul-
tation on a Small Business Act for Europe’ <http://www.eurochambres.eu> accessed 5 
March 2012. For results of consultations with stakeholders, see Commission, ‘Question-
naire on the Patent System in Europe’; and Commission, ‘Future Patent Policy in Europe 
- Public Hearing on 12 July 2006’ available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ind-
prop/patent/consultation_en.htm> accessed 5 March 2012.
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the entire EU territory. Overall expenses of patent protection in the EU 
amount to approximately EUR 193 million per year.85 Furthermore, a 
patent is on average validated in only ﬁ ve Member States,86 as the trans-
lation in ﬁ ve languages alone costs more than obtaining a patent in the 
US or Japan,87 thus making patent protection in the EU about ten times 
more expensive than in the latter countries.88 With 70% of the total costs 
being translation costs,89 if there is any prospect for accessible, afford-
able and wider-reaching patent protection, the issue of language transla-
tion must be tackled. In this light, the idea of keeping the requirement 
for the translation of a patent application or even only patent claims into 
all the Union languages was unanimously rejected.90 Consequently, the 
restriction of language diversity in patent applications is necessary to 
establish an efﬁ cient EU patent system, until high quality translation 
machines become available. 
The Translation Proposal keeps the EPO language system in place 
by adopting its ofﬁ cial languages. The Unitary Patent Protection Pro-
posal delegates the granting of patents to the EPO; if EPO procedures are 
used, maintaining their already established language system seems ra-
tional and makes an objective distinction between languages.91 Reasons 
that are even more substantial distinguish English, French and German 
from the pool of twenty-three Union languages when it comes to patent 
applications. According to EPO statistics over the last ten years, Germa-
ny is without doubt the European country with most patent applications, 
starting with over 26,000 in 2001 and rising to 33,000 in 2010.92 France 
is second, with steadier progress, starting from 8,000 in 2001, reaching 
11,000 in 2010; the United Kingdom is next, with approximately 7,000 
85  Impact Assessment, Commission staff working paper SEC/2011/482, 13 April 2011, 16.
86  For example, ‘Study on the Cost of Patenting in Europe’ (2004) prepared on behalf of the 
EPO by Roland Berger Market Research.
87  Commission, ‘Think Small First - A Small Business Act for Europe’ (Communication) 
COM (2008) 0394 ﬁ nal.
88  Didier François, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, ‘The Cost Factor in Patent 
Systems’ (2006) Université Libre de Bruxelles Working Paper WP-CEB 06-002, 17 <https://
dipot.ulb.ac.be:8443/dspace/bitstream/2013/6307/1/bvp-0063.pdf> accessed 5 March 
2012. 
89  Commission (n 69).
90  Commission (n 87); ICC Policy statement: The EC Green Paper of 5 November 1997 on 
the Community Patent and the Patent System in Europe <http://www.iccwbo.org/id374/
index.html> accessed 17 March 2012.
91  On whether EPO system should be maintained without further changes, see IV.5 and 
IV.6. However, these assertions do not apply to the question of language.
92  Austria’s 2,000 application per year should be added to German applications, as they 
are also in German; Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have nominated English for 
translations of their applications, so they should be added to the number of applications in 
English (although with a reservation).
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applications each year. For comparison, Italy has 4,000, and Spain bare-
ly reaches 2,000 applications per year. Only the Netherlands comes close 
to the number of UK applications, and the Netherlands has designated 
English as the language for patent applications.93 All other European 
countries fall way back.94 Designating the languages of the countries 
that are most active in using the patent system as languages for the ap-
plication of the unitary patent seems therefore to be a clear and objective 
criterion which represents the least restrictive option. With models that 
would require translation into all the Union’s languages not being feasi-
ble, there is no less restrictive option than to limit the languages to those 
that are most used in the patent system.
The introduction of the unitary patent protection system aims at 
promoting scientiﬁ c and technological advances, a general objective of 
the Union recognised in article 3 TEU. Patents are crucial for innovation; 
they provide an incentive for the dissemination of ideas and increase the 
activity of the research and development sector.95 Moreover, they facilitate 
economic growth and are becoming a crucial aspect of business.96 The 
European Union has recognised the importance of intellectual property 
numerous times: the Europe 2020 Strategy aims towards an economy 
based on knowledge and innovation, which is to result in high levels of 
employment, productivity and social cohesion;97 and the Single Market 
Act emphasises that the internal market must encourage as much as it 
can innovation and creativity in order to face international competition.98 
An efﬁ cient patent system is hence a legitimate aim for the European Un-
ion to pursue. The proposed system would lower the translation costs to 
EUR 680 for the entire area of the European Union, thus bringing the 
expenses down to 2% of the current price and saving EUR 49 to 65.2 
million when compared to the present system.99 Studies have shown that 
such cost reduction leads to an increase in patent ﬁ lings,100 which makes 
this strategy suitable for reaching the Union’s objectives.
93  EPO statistics, ﬁ ling 2001-2010 per country of residence of the applicant. 
94  ibid.
95  Dominique Guellec, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, ‘The Economics of the Eu-
ropean Patent System’ (OUP 2007); ‘Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges’ 
OECD 2004 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/24508541.pdf> accessed 17 March 
2012.
96  Eurostat data 2008 <http://www.oceantomo.com/productsandservices/investments/
indexes/ot300> accessed 17 March 2012.
97  Commission ‘Europe 2020’ COM (2012) 299 ﬁ nal.
98  Commission, Single Market Act’ COM (2012) 573 ﬁ nal.
99  Commission (n 87).
100  Jérôme Danguy, Bruno Van Pottelsberghe, ‘Patent Fees for a Sustainable EU (Com-
munity) Patent System’ <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/patent/index_
en.htm> accessed 17 March 2012.
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When it comes to proportionality stricto sensu, it should be assessed 
whether the cost of the restriction is proportionate to the beneﬁ ts which 
are expected to be reached.101 In reviewing the core idea of the proposed 
policy, instead of repeating the aforementioned expected beneﬁ ts and 
potential costs of language diversity, justiﬁ cation of the policy, and thus 
the answer to the proportionality test, can be found in the fact that none 
of the Member States, nor the European Union as a whole, question the 
necessity of limiting the number of languages in patent applications. 
The latest discussion among the Member States and the EU does not 
focus on the objectives of the EU patent system, as they are already well 
recognised, neither does it focus on the inevitability of language limita-
tion. It is no longer disputed that such limitation is proportionate to the 
beneﬁ ts; the only question is which languages should be designated as 
ofﬁ cial ones. The necessity test shows not only that the limitation is 
necessary, but that limitation to the particular languages proposed in 
the Translation Proposal is also necessary. With the disputed choice of 
languages being necessary to obtain the recognised EU objectives, and 
with all the actors supporting the underlying idea of language limita-
tions, the proposed Translation Proposal complies with the principle of 
proportionality.  
Therefore, even if the proposed language system does fall under the 
scope of the non-discrimination principle, the restriction is justiﬁ ed un-
der the requirements for the legality of such a limitation. The restriction 
is based on the Treaty, has a recognised, legitimate aim of technologi-
cal and scientiﬁ c advancement, does not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve that aim, and does not endanger the essence of the right to 
language diversity.
III.4. Internal market and distortion of competition
While the ﬁ rst paragraph of article 326 TFEU sets a general provi-
sion on compliance with Union law, the second paragraph emphasises 
that enhanced cooperation must not have a detrimental effect on the 
internal market:
Such cooperation shall not undermine the internal market or eco-
nomic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall not constitute a barrier 
to or discrimination in trade between Member States, nor shall it dis-
tort competition between them.
This caveat seems to send a clear message: although a group of 
Member States is allowed to integrate, the general objective of establish-
101  Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in the EU Law’ (2010) 
16(2) European Law Journal 158.
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ing the internal market is still a higher priority and it must not be hin-
dered by the use of enhanced cooperation.
III.4.a) Barriers to trade
Regarding barriers to trade, the unitary patent protection facilitates 
better market integration of the area it covers. However, it should be as-
sessed whether enhanced cooperation, namely limiting the unitary patent 
protection to twenty-ﬁ ve Member States, raises barriers to trade in respect 
of the non-participating Member States, as Italy and Spain claim.102
Unitary patent protection covers the territory of only twenty-ﬁ ve 
Member States and does not include the territories of Italy and Span, 
thus partitioning the internal market into three separate protection ar-
eas. The aspect in which the use of unitary patent protection potentially 
hinders trade concerns the products protected just in the participating, 
or just in one or both of the non-participating, Member States. Such 
territorial divergence in protection could discourage or even prevent the 
import of products from one area to another and impede the free move-
ment of goods.103
At the moment, the same problem exists with regard to all twenty-
seven national territories. This is not just a hypothetical problem, either. 
The high costs and complexity of national validation required in the ex-
isting system result in a patent being protected on average on the terri-
tory of only ﬁ ve Member States,104 hence partitioning the internal market 
not as an exception, but as a rule.
Still, the European Court of Justice has taken the position that 
these national systems and their requirements to ﬁ le translations into 
national languages do not impede intra-Community trade.105 The Court 
accepted the argument claiming that the costs and complicated vali-
dation requirements might result in a patent being protected only in 
some Member States, thus dividing the market into a zone of protection 
and a free zone.106 Moreover, it acknowledged that having patent protec-
tion in only some Member States causes differences in the movement of 
goods.107 But the Court then emphasised that such differences depend 
on ‘the actual, unforeseeable decisions taken by each of the operators in 
102  Spain (n 5) point 3.2; Italy (n 5) fourth argument.
103  Exclusivity is the essence of the rights that patents confer on their proprietor, and 
where the import of products which would infringe the patent can be opposed.
104  See III.3; see also n 86.
105  Case C-44/98 BASF [1999] ECR I-06269.
106  ibid, para 17.
107  ibid, para 20.
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the light of the economic conditions existing on the various markets’,108 
which makes them too uncertain and too indirect to be characterised as 
creating obstacles to trade in the meaning of prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions or measures having equivalent effect.109 Consequently, the 
division of the market caused by the existence of twenty-seven different 
national systems was claimed not to undermine the internal market.
Unitary patent protection creates a third level of patent protection, 
not to replace but to supplement the existing European and national sys-
tems. Furthermore, it is only the territory of such protection that is limit-
ed to participating Member States, as the unitary effect can be obtained 
regardless of the residence or nationality of the patent proprietor. The 
choice of patent system and the area for protection are still completely 
dependent upon the decision of the patent proprietor. The effects of these 
decisions should, according to the Court’s case law, be considered too 
uncertain and too indirect to impede cross-border trade.
Additionally, the possibilities for heterogeneous patent protection in-
crease with the number of areas for which the patent can be protected, 
so three protection areas should be considered more convenient than 
twenty-seven. In addition, it is more probable that the product will not 
be protected for the entire internal market with only national systems 
existing than with a unitary patent protection available. The main ambi-
tion of the proposed system is to make patent protection more feasible by 
lowering the overall cost for patent protection over the entire territory of 
the internal market,110 and such savings could have a spill over effect on 
the Italian and Spanish market as well.
Perception of the unitary patent protection system as an obstacle to 
trade would mean applying much stricter criteria than those used for the 
current system. The differences in trade caused by fragmented patent 
protection have so far been considered as not to infringe the free move-
ment of goods. The proposed unitary protection does not create new dis-
parities; on the contrary, it works to eliminate them. It completely abol-
ishes the borders between the participating Member States, and could 
have a positive effect on the non-participating ones as well.111 Of course, 
the integration of the internal market would be better if unitary patent 
protection was available for the entire Union territory, and if that option 
was possible, enhanced cooperation would not be used.112 If the detri-
108  ibid.
109  ibid, para 21.
110  See III.3.
111  Enrico Bonadio, ‘The EU Embraces Enhanced Cooperation in Patent Matters: Towards a 
Unitary Patent Protection System’ (2011) 3 European Journal of Risk Regulation 416, 420.
112  The last resort principle would prevent the use of enhanced cooperation. See III.2.
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mental effect is to be assessed in the light of whether it would be better 
if all Member States cooperated, it is difﬁ cult to conceive of a case of 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the internal market that would pass 
such scrutiny.113 The area of the internal market has been considered 
eligible for enhanced cooperation ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam,114 
and a change of approach on that issue would be legally unfounded.
III.4.b) Distortion of competition
Italy and Spain claim that the choice of languages in the Transla-
tion Proposal distorts competition by giving a competitive advantage to 
business in the countries whose ofﬁ cial language is English, French or 
German.115 Both countries would rather have English as the only ofﬁ cial 
language of patent applications, as they consider that it would put all 
(non English speaking) companies on an equal footing. In addition, Spain 
submitted a plea claiming that the proposed system disrespects Spain’s 
interests. In this regard, a closer look should be taken at the impact 
the proposed language regime will have on competition between compa-
nies from English, French or German speaking countries and those from 
other countries. The issue of Spain’s interest, and the appropriateness of 
assigning only the English language, should be considered.
In the proposed system, a patent application can be submitted in 
any language, but has to be translated into English, German or French. 
The costs of translation in one of these languages for the application sub-
mitted in any other of the Union’s ofﬁ cial languages will be reimbursed 
up to a certain ceiling.116 Such reimbursements are to be ﬁ nanced from 
the renewal fees for unitary patent protection. Furthermore, the proposed 
transitional period is of crucial importance here. For twelve years after 
the proposed legislation comes into force, patents in French or German 
will have to be submitted with an English translation, and patents in 
English with a translation into any other Union language.117 The point of 
this transitional period is to wait until high quality translation machines 
are available. After the transitional period expires, the requirement for the 
mentioned additional translations will be abolished, and the translation 
machines will translate all applications into all the Union’s languages.118
113  This is the ﬁ rst case of enhanced cooperation in the area of the internal market, as the 
Rome III Regulation concerns the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
114  The Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty respectively broadened 
the scope of the application of enhanced cooperation.
115  Italy (n 5) argument 4; Spain (n 5) point 3.2.
116  Art 5 TP (n 16).
117  Art 6 TP (n 16).
118  ibid.
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Therefore, during the transitional period, companies from countries 
that do not share the ofﬁ cial patent application languages can submit the 
patent application in any Union language, including Italian and Spanish. 
They will have to translate it into English, French or German, but will also 
receive a reimbursement of that cost. If they choose to translate it into 
English, there will be no further requirements. On the other hand, com-
panies from English, French or German speaking countries can submit 
a patent application in their languages, but have to accompany it with a 
translation in English, for which they will not be reimbursed. In effect, it 
does not seem likely they will have any competitive advantage regarding 
the language of application, let alone one sufﬁ cient to cause a distortion 
of competition.
After the transitional period, all languages will still be permitted 
for patent application, but high quality translation machines would then 
translate them in all Union languages. In this phase, all companies will 
truly be on an equal footing.
Still, it seems that both Spain and Italy would support a proposal 
designating only English as the ofﬁ cial language of patent applications. 
Some stakeholders have also expressed the desire for a unilingual, Eng-
lish model,119 since English is the customary language in the ﬁ eld of in-
ternational research,120 commonly used in technical ﬁ elds and by most 
patent experts.121
The option of a unilingual model was reviewed in the Impact Assess-
ment of 2010,122 but rejected when it was asserted that it would be det-
rimental to the users of the current EPO regime. Companies that at the 
moment ﬁ le applications in French and German would face additional 
costs and logistic complexities, as they would have to undergo signiﬁ cant 
changes of practice.123 These companies are not only French or German 
businesses, as 48% of the applications submitted to the EPO from the 
European Union use one of these two languages.124
119  Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, SEC (2011) 482/2. 
120  Riley (n 82) 303.
121  UNICE Position Paper on the Green Paper on the Community Patent and the Patent 
System in Europe (1997) Intellectual Property Rights Vol.7, No.8 <http://www.unice.org/
unice/docum.nsf/all+by+description/041A4F216C32AFA6CI 2568B0004 A76D3/$File/
Ipr-doc.pdf.> accessed 17 March 2012.
122  Impact Assessment (n 85).
123  ibid.
124  Internal EPO data 2009.
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There are even more reasons for not using only English.125 Germany 
and France submit most patent applications in Europe,126 and are not 
reimbursed for the costs under the currently proposed system. If English 
was the only language, there would be no ground to deny the proprietors 
who use French or German in their applications fair reimbursement for 
translation costs, as received by all users not sharing the ofﬁ cial lan-
guage. This would signiﬁ cantly raise the number of reimbursements and 
result in an increase in the renewal fees from which such payments are 
administered, thus having a negative effect for all users of the unitary 
patent protection.
Under the current proposal, English is given an enhanced role, as 
companies not using German of French can submit an application in 
their own national language and supplement it only with an English 
translation. Spanish companies at the moment use English in 93% of 
their applications, and will be allowed to continue doing so in the fu-
ture.127 However, Spain still considers that its rights are not respected. 
Article 327 TFEU refers to the impact enhanced cooperation is allowed to 
have on the non-participating Member States: Any enhanced cooperation 
shall respect the competences, rights and obligations of those Member 
States which do not participate in it’. Ever since enhanced cooperation 
was introduced, it has been considered that use of enhanced coopera-
tion must not harm non-participating Member States. The Amsterdam 
Treaty has been setting a high threshold for the rights of non-participat-
ing Member States, by specifying that enhanced cooperation ‘shall not 
affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those member 
states which do not participate therein’.128 This provision was changed 
in the Nice Treaty, which replaced the term ‘affect’ with ‘respect’, as it 
stands today.129 This was clearly not just a slight terminological modiﬁ -
cation; it mitigated the requirement.130
In effect, even if the Translation Proposal does not take the interests 
of Spanish companies into account, this does not amount to disrespect 
for the rights of Spain and hence an infringement of article 327 TFEU. 
125  The issue of legal certainty can also be raised. The disclosure of information is the main 
purpose of patents, and having a translation into only one language, especially English, is 
not as effective as having it in at least two.
126  EPO statistics (n 93).
127  EurActiv Network, ‘Rapporteur: Italy is Substantially Isolated on Patent Issue’ (24 June 
2011) <http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/rapporteur-italy-substantially-
isolated-patent-issue-interview-505917> accessed 17 March 2012 .
128  Article 41 para 3 Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C340/1 (hereinafter Amsterdam Trea-
ty) (emphasis added).
129  Article 41 of the Treaty of Nice [2001] OJ C80/1 (hereinafter Nice Treaty).
130  Cantore (n 38) 6, quoting Rossi and Craig. 
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When deciding on the case of the Community Trademark Regulation, 
the Court has reﬂ ected upon the issue of languages used in intellectual 
property systems.131 The fact that intellectual property is not created for 
the beneﬁ t of all citizens, but for economic operators, was taken into ac-
count. Users of the system are not obliged to utilise it;132 they do so in 
the context of their professional activity that leads to making proﬁ t.133 
Consequently, the argument that the users must bear the costs was up-
held.134 The Court then described the language regimes of the intellec-
tual property systems as the ‘result of a difﬁ cult process which seeks to 
achieve the necessary balance between the interests of economic opera-
tors and the public interest in terms of the cost of proceedings’.135 The 
conclusion was that limiting the regime to the most widely known lan-
guages is proportionate, and the suggestion of using only one language 
was rejected. This decision authorises legislation to derogate from the 
interests of economic operators, as these interests are not absolute, but 
have to be balanced with other interests and circumstances.
The Translation Proposal does not create a competitive advantage 
for companies from English, French or German speaking countries, nor 
does it diminish the competitive advantages of companies from other 
countries. The English language model is not necessary for the preser-
vation of competition; on the contrary, it would harm all the users of the 
system. Lastly, even if enhanced cooperation does not respect Spain’s 
interest, this does not result in a violation of rights, as the Court’s case 
law clearly shows that the interests of a Member State do not amount 
to a right. Overall, all aspects of enhanced cooperation comply with the 
prohibition of undermining the internal market.
IV. The Unitary Patent Protection Proposal - a correct legal basis
IV.1. Legal basis for unitary patent protection
The European Union’s competence to create new forms of intellec-
tual property has been recognised for over 20 years. Although previous 
versions of the Treaties did not explicitly provide powers to do so, estab-
lishing legal instruments for protection of intellectual property was con-
sidered to fall under article 352 TFEU, a residual legal basis for meas-
131  Kik (n 76).
132  ibid, para 88.
133  ibid, para 89.
134  ibid.
135  ibid, para 92.
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ures necessary to attain the Treaties’ objectives.136 The European Court 
of Justice repeatedly conﬁ rmed this approach,137 and article 352 was 
invoked for the creation of the Community trademark138 and the Com-
munity design.139 
 The issue was simpliﬁ ed with the Lisbon Treaty,140 as article 118 
TFEU now explicitly authorises the European Union to establish meas-
ures creating European intellectual property. The ﬁ rst paragraph of ar-
ticle 118 TFEU deﬁ nes both the object to be created and the goal which 
that object is to achieve:
[T]he European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the 
creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union.
If this provision is to be applied, the aim of providing unitary pro-
tection must be achieved by means of creating European intellectual 
property rights, with the term ‘creation’ unquestionably referring to the 
making of something new.
Article 118 TFEU is invoked as a legal basis for unitary patent pro-
tection in the Authorising Decision, and consequently in the Unitary 
Patent Protection Proposal. Although recourse to article 118 TFEU seems 
an appropriate choice for the creation of unitary patents, it is doubtful 
whether the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal complies with the re-
quirements speciﬁ ed in the ﬁ rst paragraph of article 118 TFEU, namely 
whether it introduces a new intellectual property right.
IV.2. What constitutes a new intellectual property right? 
To ascertain whether the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal is 
correctly grounded on article 118 TFEU, it is ﬁ rst necessary to estab-
136  Article 235 EEC/EC, then art 308 EC as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, now article 352 TFEU.
137  Case C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, para 24; Opinion of the Court 1/94 
ECR I-5267, para 59; Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-
07079, para 24.
138  Council Regulation EC/40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark 
[1994] OJ L11/1.
139  Council Regulation EC/6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs [2002] 
OJ L3.
140  Simpliﬁ ed because there is no need to prove the necessity of the measure, and because 
of a change in legislative procedure: art 352 TFEU requires unanimity in the Council and 
gives the European Parliament an advisory role, while art 118 TFEU prescribes an ordinary 
legislative procedure for the introduction of new rights; a special legislative procedure with 
the Council acting unanimously is required only for translation agreements.
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lish what constitutes a new intellectual property right. The European 
Court of Justice created a body of case law regarding the issue when 
deciding on the legal basis for previously introduced intellectual prop-
erty protection mechanisms, and has set a high threshold for whether 
certain modiﬁ cations amount to creating a new intellectual property 
right.
In this light, the Directive on biotechnological inventions only ap-
proximates laws, and does not create a new right.141 Even though this di-
rective changed an essential, substantive element of patents by altering 
the scope of products eligible for patent protection, the Court nonetheless 
perceived patents issued under the directive as ‘old’ national patents. 
The decisive factor was that they are still granted through national pro-
cedures and derive their force from national law. Additionally, it was sig-
niﬁ cant that the creation of a Community patent is neither the purpose 
nor the effect of this directive.142
Likewise, the Regulation creating a supplementary protection cer-
tiﬁ cate,143 which prolongs the duration of patents, was also considered 
not to give rise to a new right. The length of the protection period is fun-
damental for deﬁ ning the concept of patents, but the Court emphasised 
that it does not affect the substance of rights.144
On the other hand, the Community trademark is appropriately rec-
ognised as a new EU form of intellectual property.145 The Community 
Trademark Regulation provides a new title, regulates both procedural 
and substantive trademark law, priority, use and licensing of trade-
marks, as well as conditions for revocation and invalidity.146
Therefore, when assessing whether the legislation introduces a new 
intellectual property right, attention should be paid to its aims and ef-
fects, as well as whether it fully governs the conditions and procedure 
for granting, and for the existence and substance of, the right in ques-
tion.
141  Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L213/13.
142  Spain v Council (n 137) para 25.
143  Council Regulation EEC/1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a sup-
plementary protection certiﬁ cate for medicinal products [1992] OJ L182/1.
144  Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-07079, paras 15 
and 27.
145  Conﬁ rmed in Spain v Council (n 137) para 23.
146  Council Regulation EC/207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark 
[2009] OJ L78/1.
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IV.3. Application to the proposal
Under the criteria established by the European Court of Justice, it 
is no longer certain that the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal actually 
introduces a new intellectual property right and can thus be based on 
article 118 TFEU.
 The very titles of the Decision authorising enhanced cooperation 
in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection and the Proposal 
for a Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection reveal that they focus directly on the 
goal of unitary protection. Both documents entirely leave out mention 
of the creation of rights when rephrasing article 118 in their preambles, 
and the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal reveals why: the aim of ar-
ticle 118 is to be achieved by giving unitary effect to European patents 
granted by the EPO.147 Consequently, the Unitary Patent Protection Pro-
posal does not introduce a new patent title.
The main added value of the proposed system is providing a patent 
proprietor with the possibility to register unitary effect for the European 
patent already granted by the EPO.148 Such a European patent with uni-
tary effect could be limited, transferred, revoked or could lapse only for 
the entire territory of all Member States taking part in enhanced coop-
eration.149 Regardless of its possible practical importance, this novelty 
only adds another characteristic to the existing, non-EU instrument of 
the European patent.150
The nature of unitary protection is accessory to the European pat-
ent,151 which is granted according to the rules, procedures and condi-
tions provided by the EPC and implemented by the EPO.152 Therefore, all 
European patents go through the same established EPO procedure and 
have to abide by the same EPC substantive provisions. The only change 
the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal introduces regarding acquisition 
of the right is the abolishment of national validation. National valida-
tion is required after the grant of European patents, but will not be a 
prerequisite for European patents with unitary effect.153 The validation 
147  Preamble, para 7, UPPP (n 16).
148  Art 3 para 1 UPPP (n 16).
149  Art 3 para 2 UPPP (n 16).
150  www.unitary-patent.eu, ‘Legal Basis for the Unitary Patent: Do Not Play with Fire!’ 
(5 July 2011) <http://unitary-patent.eu/content/legal-basis-unitary-patent-do-not-play-
ﬁ re> accessed 1 March 2012.
151  Art 3 para 3 UPPP (n 16).
152  Art 2 b) and c) UPPP (n 16).
153  Arts 4 and art 10 para 4 UPPP (n 16).
328 Tihana BalagoviÊ: Enhanced Cooperation: Is There Hope for the Unitary Patent?
procedures consist of registering a patent in the national patent ofﬁ ce, by 
paying a registration fee and publishing a translation in a national lan-
guage.154 The Unitary Patent Protection Proposal provides an alternative 
possibility of registering a European patent with unitary effect, which 
will be done solely at the EPO.155 Although the elimination of national 
validation could contribute to cost effectiveness, the change is purely 
administrative. 
On the other hand, substantive questions of validity, infringement 
and limitation through compulsory licence, crucial for the existence of a 
right after its granting, are not regulated by the Proposal. They remain 
to be governed by national laws,156 resulting in the European patent with 
unitary effect not having an autonomous character.157 
Consequently, the granting phase remains to be governed by the 
EPC, while the post-granting life of the patent is still subjected to na-
tional provisions. The Unitary Patent Protection Proposal refers to uni-
tary protection as an instrument of its own,158 and fails to address issues 
necessary for the genuine creation of rights. It does not, in its aim or ef-
fect, introduce a new European intellectual property right and therefore 
cannot be based on article 118 TFEU.
At the moment, this issue is not tackled by the claims of Italy and 
Spain, as they deal only with the Authorising Decision. But if the Uni-
tary Patent Protection Proposal is to be adopted without a proper legal 
basis it would be in breach of law, and further actions for annulment can 
be expected. As the annulment of the implementation act would render 
the entire enhanced cooperation meaningless, this mistake should be 
corrected before the proposal is adopted.
IV.4. Possible ways forward
There are two ways to ﬁ x the wrong choice of legal basis for a piece 
of legislation. The ﬁ rst is to ﬁ nd a different, proper legal basis in the Trea-
ties, and the second is to amend the proposed legislation to comply with 
the requirements of the invoked legal basis.
154  Rodriguez (n 36) 575; Art 65 para 1 EPC (n 8).
155  Art 12 para 1 b) UPPP (n 16).
156  Preamble paras 8 and 9 UPPP (n 16).
157  Helena Olsen, ‘European Patent with Unitary Effect: Reduction of High Costs Relating 
to Patents Valid throughout the EU?’ (2011) Patents in Europe 11, 40. 
158  Preamble para 1 UPPP (n 16).
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IV.4.a) New legal basis
If the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal stays the same and con-
tinues to refrain from introducing a new intellectual property right, it 
should be based on a different legal basis from article 118 TFEU. Article 
114 TFEU, providing powers for the harmonisation of laws necessary for 
the functioning of the internal market, and the residual legal basis of 
article 352 TFEU, come to mind as possible solutions.
However, keeping the proposed system which does not introduce a 
new patent title means that the EU is about to relinquish prospects of 
control over an originally EU concept of the unitary patent, thus putting 
the protection of EU interests and the efﬁ ciency of such a patent system 
at risk.
In the current version of the proposal, the EPO is endowed with the 
governance of patents in the pre-grant phase. It would be completely 
misplaced to believe that the EPO is ﬁ t to guard any of the EU’s interests 
intertwined with patent protection, as it does not even consider itself 
to be subjected to the rules of EU law.159 Moreover, the EPO is assigned 
with not only the implementing, but also with the legislative, role. By 
giving unitary effect to European patents, all future amendments of the 
EPC are blankly accepted, as the EU has no inﬂ uence over them what-
soever.160
The EU has lately been criticised for its own lack of democratic le-
gitimacy, and in response is striving to augment the role of the European 
Parliament in the legislative process.161 The course of action presented in 
the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal runs contrary to that ambition. It 
suggests circumventing the legitimising role of the European Parliament 
for the beneﬁ t of an intergovernmental organisation frequently criticised 
for a lack of democratic legitimacy by academics, EPO staff, governmen-
tal studies, and even the European Parliament and the Commission 
themselves.162  
159 See EPO’s ‘Notice dated 1 July 1999 concerning the amendment of the Implementing 
Regulations to the European Patent Convention’ EPO OJ 8-9/1999 (1999) 573 para 2; 
see also EPO’s Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal dated 28 June 2007 G 1/06 OJ 
5/2008 (2007) point 6.
160  They reﬂ ect a compromise of wishes between 38 contracting states.
161  Beate Kohler-Koch, Berthold Rittberger (eds), ‘Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of 
the European Union’ (Rowman & Littleﬁ eld 2007) 10; see also the Lisbon judgment, 2 BvE 
2/08 (2009) BVerfG.
162  Susana Borrás, Charalampo Koutalakis, Frank Wendler, ‘European Agencies and Input 
Legitimacy: EFSA, EMeA and EPO in the Post-Delegation Phase’ (2007) 29(5) Journal of Eu-
ropean Integration 583; www.unitary-patent.eu, ‘Criticism of Governance of the European 
Patent Ofﬁ ce’ (16 May 2011) <http://unitary-patent.eu/content/criticisms-governance-eu-
ropean-patent-ofﬁ ce> accessed 2 March 2012.
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The post-granting phase of the patent is left for national laws, which 
raises concerns about the added value of unitary patent protection. Can 
a piece of legislation claim to introduce unitary effect without deﬁ ning 
essential aspects of that effect any further than stipulating that it is 
unitary? The Unitary Patent Protection Proposal speciﬁ es that the Euro-
pean patent with unitary effect may be limited, transferred, revoked or 
may lapse only in respect of all Member States,163 but it does not regu-
late the transfer, revocation or lapse of rights in question. Thus, aspects 
vital for the existence of the mentioned unitary protection are still not 
regulated uniformly, and the stakes are higher as a decision made under 
one national law should be recognised all over the territory of unitary 
protection. The divergence of national legal systems is thus even more 
emphasised and amounts to a threat to legal certainty, an essential pre-
requisite of the aims envisaged for the EU patent.164 Furthermore, rights 
stemming from national provisions are not supplemented with the char-
acteristics of EU law that would improve the efﬁ ciency of unitary patent 
protection, namely autonomy in interpretation, direct applicability and 
primacy in the case of conﬂ icts.165
Therefore, the ﬁ rst option of changing the legal basis and keep-
ing the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal unchanged would present a 
threat to the EU legal order, as the proposal entrusts patent protection to 
an intergovernmental institution that does not respect the autonomy and 
supremacy of EU law, and jeopardises democratic principles. Moreover, 
this proposal does not offer a satisfactory level of legal certainty. 
IV.4.b) Amendments to the proposal
An analysis of the ﬁ rst option shows that the mistake lies not in the 
choice of a legal basis that requires the creation of new intellectual prop-
erty, but in the content of the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal that 
does not introduce an autonomous EU patent.
Even before the explicit legal basis was introduced in the Lisbon 
Treaty, all previous drafts and discussions were aimed at an independ-
ent, EU legal instrument, referred to as a crucial element for the estab-
lishment of the internal market.166 Patent protection is intertwined with 
163  Art 3 para 2 UPPP (n 16). 
164  L Karamountzos, ‘Community Patent and European Patent Court: State of play in the 
Council’ (2009) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/events/ workshop/20090317/ka-
ramountsos_en.pdf > accessed 17 March 2012.
165  Jaeger (n 45) 7.
166  Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry and Research), Press release 17076/09 of 4 
December 2009 of the 2982nd Council Meeting <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/111744.pdf> accessed 5 March 2012. 
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numerous areas relevant to the European Union,167 and the creation of 
the European Union patent governed by EU law and under the supervi-
sion of the European Court of Justice would facilitate the proper balanc-
ing and coordination of EU patent policy with other vital issues.168 For 
example, additional aims of the EU patent system should be to further 
market integration and to produce competitive advantages for EU inno-
vators.169 
In order to reach these aims, the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal 
should by itself codify the EPC rules for the granting of patents. This 
turns out to be an even more viable option since practice shows that 
some EPC rules seem to require further interpretation due to the newest 
developments in the area of patents.170 A speciﬁ c EU patent title should 
be introduced, and substantive patent law regarding both the granting 
and existence of patents should be added. This would facilitate the pur-
poseful navigation of general developments in patent law and provide 
control and legitimisation of EPO decisions.171 Moreover, greater uniﬁ ca-
tion of patent protection would be achieved. Rules applying to a patent 
with unitary effect would be uniformly legislated for and interpreted, 
leading towards legal certainty and predictable litigation outcomes. Con-
trol over the substantive rules on patents, their administration and im-
plementation would on the one hand preserve the interests of the EU, 
and on the other hand enable the EU patent system to reach the beneﬁ ts 
of providing efﬁ cient unitary patent protection.  
Therefore, the Unitary Patent Protection Proposal should introduce 
a sui generis patent title, as that would not only bring it into compliance 
with the invoked legal basis of article 118 TFEU, but would also make it 
more beneﬁ cial for the functioning of the EU patent system, as well as 
for the EU as a whole. 
 
167  Opinion of the Court 1/09 [2011] ECR 00000 Opinion of AG Kokott, para 80.
168  General intellectual property policy (plant varieties, trade marks, etc), competition, in-
ternal market issues, regional and SME policies.
169  Jens Schovsbo, ‘Constructing an Efﬁ cient and Balanced European Patent System: Mud-
dling through’ (2011) 2 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1932690> 
accessed 1 March 2012. 
170  The EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal explicitly requested the legislative clariﬁ cations. 
See Opinion G 3/08 published on 12 May 2010: ‘When Judiciary-driven Legal Development 
Meets Its Limits, It Is Time for the Legislator to Take Over’.
171  I Schneider, ‘Governing the Patent System in Europe: The EPO’s Supranational Au-
tonomy and its Need for a Regulatory Perspective’ (2009) 36(8) Science and Public Policy 
619, 628.
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V. Conclusion 
At ﬁ rst glance, it seems doubtful whether the introduction of uni-
tary patent protection by enhanced cooperation complies with the legal 
requirements of such cooperation. Nevertheless, closer insight reveals 
that the issues contested for violations actually present the inherent 
characteristics of the system.
On the one hand, the introduction of cost-effective and efﬁ cient uni-
tary patent protection has an impact on numerous issues considered to 
be of vital interest for the European Union. It encompasses the matter of 
unity of the European Union, preservation of language diversity, integra-
tion of the internal market, enhancement of competitiveness and incen-
tives for research and development. It is a ﬁ eld in which various interests 
collide, making certain compromises essential for the establishment of 
the European Union patent system. 
On the other hand, enhanced cooperation is in its nature an excep-
tion to the rule. If it is ever to be utilised, the territory over which it has 
effect and the use of European Union institutions will be restricted to 
the participating Member States. Accordingly, it is capable of facilitating 
direct internal market integration only for those Member States. How-
ever, when the reaching of consensus at the European Union level turns 
out to be impossible, the institute of enhanced cooperation seems better 
than the alternatives, namely taking no action or taking action outside 
the framework of the European Union.
Furthermore, it appears that the use of enhanced cooperation in 
the case of unitary patent protection complies with the law and respects 
the set safeguards. The creation of European intellectual property is an 
internal market measure and not an exclusive competence of the Union, 
as it falls under the ﬁ eld of shared competences and does not prevent the 
non participating Member States from establishing their own transna-
tional intellectual property instruments. Enhanced cooperation is used 
as a last resort, as no agreement seems possible in the foreseeable fu-
ture. The chosen language regime does not amount to discrimination, 
but even if it did, it would be a justiﬁ ed limitation, as it is necessary 
and suitable to achieve the Treaties’ objectives, respects the essence of 
the right to language diversity and is proportionate. It would not cre-
ate a competitive advantage for the countries using the designated lan-
guages and thus does not discriminate in trade or distort competition. 
It achieves a better integration of the internal market between the par-
ticipating Member States, and, according to the Court’s case law, should 
not be considered as creating obstacles to trade for the non-participating 
Member States.
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However, the implementation of enhanced cooperation is worrisome. 
The Unitary Patent Protection Proposal does not introduce a new intel-
lectual property right, and thus fails to comply with the invoked legal 
basis. Of two ways to ﬁ x the problem of a lack of correct legal basis for the 
Unitary Patent Protection Proposal, the ﬁ rst option of changing the legal 
basis would mean that the shortcomings of the current Unitary Patent 
Protection Proposal would remain. This could prove detrimental for the 
efﬁ ciency of unitary patent protection, as well as for the interests of the 
European Union as a whole. It would be quite a missed opportunity if the 
legitimate case of enhanced cooperation failed to address all issues nec-
essary for the optimal patent protection system. Therefore, the Unitary 
Patent Protection Proposal should be revised and accordingly amended 
to comply with the legal basis of article 118 TFEU.
The European Court of Justice will have the ﬁ nal say on the legality 
of enhanced cooperation, and will hopefully clarify this overlooked in-
strument and determine some of the conditions for its application. In the 
meantime, the problem of the lack of a correct legal basis for the Unitary 
Patent Protection Proposal must be solved, as otherwise an action for 
annulment can certainly be expected.

